

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERBERT OF CHERBURY.

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FAME has not dealt kindly with Herbert. Though he had the friendship and approval of Grotius, was admired and controverted by Gassendi, and later gained the honour of a criticism from Locke, he has, as regards philosophy, remained a prophet without honour.

For this there are more reasons than one. Herbert was not in touch with the tendencies of his age towards physical science and its practical applications. He wrote when the political horizon was clouded, and he died before the civil war was over; so that his books were first introduced in times of trouble, and when they reappeared had no longer their author's fostering care. And his personality rather militated against philosophic reputation: he was to the world a gallant and a duellist, a diplomatist and a courtier, anything but a philosopher.

Nevertheless, though he himself tells us that one year is enough for philosophy, "and six months for Logic; for I am confident a man may have quickly more than he needs of these two arts" (Life, ed. 1770, p. 31), it is impossible to doubt his philosophic earnestness. Unlike his great contemporary, Bacon, he is less dilettante than he seems. Amid his amours and his quarrels, whether he is serving in the Low Countries, brawling at home, or, as ambassador at Paris, bearding the court-favourite—when fencing with Montmorency, or writing verses to Ben Jonson, and an epitaph for his guide and friend Donne, he is never turned aside from philosophy.

His poems, while they now give us the very rhythm and spirit of *In Memoriam*, and now, as Mr. Churton Collins has noted, come near to Browning, are all metaphysical, and all in feeling Platonic. His life, while it displays vanities and weaknesses, shows him solemnly asking for a sign from heaven, whether the publication of his *De Veritate* should be for God's glory and the advancement of truth or no:—"if not I will suppress it." And this is the true Herbert—George Herbert's brother. Horace Walpole was not altogether wrong when he summed up Herbert's autobiography in the characteristic dictum, "The History of Don Quixote was the Life of Plato."

Herbert's claims to rank technically as a philosopher rest on two books—*De Veritate*, published 1624, and again, in a larger form, in 1633, and *De Religione Gentilium*, of which a part was published in 1645, and the whole posthumously in 1663.

The *De Veritate* proposes to examine Truth, the scales so to speak by which all else is weighed. It begins by distinguishing (I) the Truth or Reality of Things, by which is meant self-identity, and (II) *Our Truth*, which is conditional, and is either (a) Truth of Appearance, or the conformity of appearance with things, (b) Truth of Conception, or the conformity of our *facultates prodromæ* with the thing as manifested, and (c) Truth of Intellect, or the conformity of these truths in the return of mind upon itself.

Either Appearance or Conception may be false, though their falsity has a truth of its own. Truth of one may co-exist with falsity of the other. Intellect, on the other hand, is not liable to delusion, but is correct if its premisses are correct, and, if they are not so, can correct them.

Truth for us lies in relation. We have then to consider the object, the faculty, and the conformity of these.

All things are not true or adequate objects; for they are not necessarily within our capacity—*intra nostram Analogiam*, i.e., so related to us as not to transcend our powers. They may be infinite or infinitesimal, and so be neither apparent nor conceivable, *nisi sub ratione finiti*, though the intellect may cognise them, discursively by means of negatives, or *notitiis suis communibus instructus*. Or a thing may lack a *principium individuationis*. Or it may be cognate to no faculty.

Even when the object itself is satisfactory, perceptual truth depends on adequate persistence of the object (*mora debiti temporis*), the purity and propriety of the medium in which it is viewed, and a due perspective; the object must further have *situm commodum*, by which he means, as he explains, a principle of order in the field (*forum*) of inner sense.

For truth of conception there are fresh conditions. The organ must be *integrum*, and tainted with no bad quality. By the latter is meant humours, and nervous disorders, and, in particular, animal spirits; jaundice and preconceptions, monomania and delirium, come under this head. The faculty must be *non vacillans* and *applicata*, i.e., it must be attentive, not intent on any other thing. And the attentive faculty must be the one related to, having affinity with the object, *analogia*.

Lastly comes truth of intellect, which acts only at the suggestion of objects, but which is never otiose nor inert, since objects can never be wanting to the innumerable faculties capable of being roused, *harmonice*, by appropriate objects.

Truths of intellect are *notitiæ communes* and truths deduced from these in a consistent system, common notions being such as are found in every sane and whole human being, dictated as it were by

nature, or given from heaven. "So far," he says, "from these being derived from experience, without some, or at least some one of them, we can have no experience."

This classification covers the whole range of simple truths. Complex truth, which deals with universals, involves a further extension in one law only: *quæ eodem modo efficiunt facultates nostras eadem erga nos sunt*.

So far as we have gone, one or two interesting points emerge. Herbert is a believer in the relativity of Knowledge. Only those things *intra nostram analogiam* belong to our truth. And yet relativity does not to him mean invalidity; truth of intellect is certainty, and there may be truth both of perception and conception.

His belief in relativity amounts to a dualism more than provisional. The principles of knowledge alone are ours, and these are not constitutive of things. The truth of things which is unconditional differs from the truth of phenomena.

Analogia is the fundamental conception of this portion of Herbert's philosophy. To every object there is its own appropriate *facultas*, the power of knowing it which it excites into activity. It is the *analogia* between the Macrocosm and the Microcosm which makes the one intelligible to the other; we cannot know that which we have not the power to know, and this power springs from the affinity which man has with God. The affinities of things among themselves and to man, and of man again to God, make the world, as given in knowledge, rational.

Herbert's theory of the conformity of the phenomena with the thing beyond our knowing is expressed in his definition of *apparentia* as "an ectype or the vicarious form of a thing conformed under definite conditions to its prototype," i.e., the perceptual order is in definite relation to the things which lie behind it. There is here no hint of the false theory of perception which we find in Bacon and in Locke, that there is in the order of knowledge a mirroring or copying of the reality beyond sense. Herbert's view is rather that the mind unfolds itself in answer to the stimulus of things, and is the interpreter and ordains the fulfilment in the world of mind of that which moves it. This doctrine, if more mystical, is perhaps less equivocal than that more current in English philosophy. It is akin rather to the guaranteed correspondence of some forms of Occasionalism, or, in different senses, to one aspect at least of the Neo-Kantian position, and to that doctrine of Transfigured Realism in which Mr. Spencer makes peace with the metaphysicians.

To return to our analysis of the *De Veritate*. All knowledge is either by (1) Natural Instinct, (2) Internal Sense, (3) External

Sense, or (4) Reasoning (*Discursus*). Natural instinct is the sense which arises from the faculties which deal with the conformity of common notions. In natural instinct we refer to, and, if necessary, explicitly point out a common notion which only those who are *insani aut mente capti* can or will deny. In discursive reasoning we infer from some such common notion. Such common notions are those which we have about the internal analogy of things especially tending to the preservation of the individual, the species, the race, the universe.

Herbert's instances of *notitiæ communes* are here as elsewhere what Locke calls "practical principles," viz., *ratio propria conservationis*, and *appetitus Beatitudinis*. In reference to the former of these, his statement—that from the special conservation of each the common safety of things depends—is a striking proof that he was at once an individualist, and inclined to get beyond the logical results of individualism.

Common notions are so absolutely, or only relatively; the latter when their objects are equivocal or doubtful, or when the *analogia* of faculty and object is so seldom realised that the most important test of universal consensus is inapplicable. An absolutely *a priori* common notion—innate, or, to use a word which Herbert opposes to adventitious or extrinsic, connate, will satisfy this test among others.

He gives six tests of a common notion: (1) priority, (2) independence, (3) universality, (4) certitude, (5) necessity, and (6) what he calls "mode of conformation." It is prior to all else dependent on nothing else, and immediate—*nulla interposita mora*—which is what he explains himself to mean by "mode of conformation"—i.e., it is not deduced. It is accepted by general consensus *insanos si demas et mente captos*, which is all that he means by universality; it is certain or self-evident—*si intelligis negare nequis*—and it is necessary, an epithet which he explains—*nulla enim notitia communis non facit ad hominis conservationem*.

Of these independence, priority, immediacy, and self-evidence do prove innateness in some sense of the word. But how are we to prove these? Herbert would probably answer by the affinity between the Macrocosm and the Microcosm, which makes it absurd to doubt. Have we any better answer as to the ultimate grounding of principles?

He himself lays the stress on "necessity"—what makes for self-preservation. The special or proper object of natural instinct is eternal blessedness, and this a man desires even when hoping and praying for annihilation. And it is here that we find a point of transition to the moral and thereby the religious side of Herbert's teaching.

For the present, however, he proceeds to discuss internal sense, which he does not adequately distinguish from natural instinct, with which, he says, it has one root. His treatment of internal sense is the least satisfactory portion of the treatise; there are subdivisions into mental, corporeal, and other classes of inner sense which, if I understand him aright, involve false principles of division; "humours," apparently, are classed under more than one heading.

In making the "mental" inner sense correspond to the attributes of God and the "bodily" to the world, he gives an intelligible ground for division, such as it is. But the corporeal senses are connected with humours, and reference is made to the carnal man in close juxtaposition with an account of man as a microcosm. Pleasures and pains are concerned here, and we find that it is external sense that really refers to the world of things, and gives the theoretic side of knowledge as opposed to the affectual or moral. All this appears confusion of the worst kind.*

However, under internal sense appears Conscience, which is always in every man and is not, as the theologians will have it, depraved nor corrupt. Conscience is defined as the *sensus communis* of the internal senses, in whose court not only what is good and what bad come up for trial, but also the degrees of goodness and badness to be weighed and pondered by means of common notions, till, with sovereign authority, judgment can be pronounced as to what ought to be done. The notion of Conscience as, so to speak, a *κοινὴ αἴσθησις*, relative not to sense proper but to affections, dealing with degrees of good and evil along a scale, and having *auctoritas eximia*, is an interesting anticipation of a good deal in subsequent theory. Herbert, however, turns aside to work out a scheme in which *bonum*, as *maxime affine vero* is distinguished *in re*, *in apparentia*, *in conceptu*, and *in intellectu*, and further development is checked. Good differs from Truth, and moral philosophy from other sciences, except perhaps mathematics, in being more a matter of consensus and of common notions!

The *proper* objects of internal noetic faculties are, it turns out, the attributes of God, all subordinated to the Love of God as a general principle; this suggests Butler and Spinoza—their *common* objects are the objects of the bodily faculties, to which the transition is thus made.

External sense is exceedingly well treated. Some of the remarks

* I prefer to print the passage as originally read, but I am inclined to doubt my comprehension of the section in Herbert. I still think it confused, but, *perhaps*, a clue to its meaning may lie in a passage which the President quoted in reference to this paper. Herbert's Life, page 22.

on the special senses are very acute, if out of date, and the main theory, viz., that there are as many differences of sense as *differentiæ* in the objects, which he defends with some verve against those who hold that there are five senses only, is interesting as throwing light on his use of the word *facultas* in its least substantial sense, and also for itself. As well, he says, say one sense as five—*omnes externi sensus ad tactum reduci possunt*; whether there be different channels (*foramina*) or no, there are different senses or faculties. In this connexion he allows—*non negamus equidem*—the statement *nihil esse in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, which, in view of his general system, is a hard saying.

Of "discourse" or discursive reasoning there is no necessity to say much, since Herbert says little. The faculties he connects therewith are worthy of remark. *Phantasia*, he tells us, presides in its court,—*phantasia* which, in some relations, is the same with common sense; memory, too, is to be found here. Memory is an act of conforming, on the part of the *facultas memorativa*, with a crass and corporeal object, fleeting and perishing; hence memory fades and dies. *Laesis organis læditur memoria. Morte tolli posse videtur*. The faculty of Reminiscence, on the other hand, with the notions imprinted by soul or mind, abides for ever—a hitting off of the doctrine of Anamnêsis, which is more successful than the lines in his Elegy for the Prince—

"Whether the soul of Man be Memory
As Plato thought."

Discursus, deduction or ratiocination has for its *summa ars* Logic, whose work is to extricate from the shrouding veil of words those common notions against which to dispute were wicked. Logic then, as *Zetetica*, is the making explicit of innate notions and principles. Its method is to raise the simple question in each of ten categories, and a complex question in each compounded category.

Rejecting the Aristotelian categories as defective, because they omit the conceptions of cause and end, because they premise neither an apt and true division of things, nor yet a critique of faculties, and finally because substance and qualities, as commonly understood, are mere figments, he propounds, as a basis of method, ten categories: *an*, *quid*, *quale*, *quantum*, *ad quid*, *quomodo*, *quando*, *ubi*, *unde*, *cujus gratia*, and the combinations of these, *an an*, *an quid*, *quid quale*, *quomodo tale*, and so forth, the abstract titles of which are somewhat uncouth,—*annitas* and *ad quidditas* being scarcely the most repellent.

In each category, simple or compound, he raises its question, and, if the answer be affirmative, further asks: Which, if any, of

the four grounds of knowledge vouches for it? Does this alone, or this best prove it? And—in the case of mediate inference,—on what *notitiæ* does the *discursus* rest?

And so he establishes his doctrine of common notions, *sive Ecclesia vere Catholica*, his five articles of religion, which he here treats categorically, in the strictest sense of the term. This is the point at which we get our transition to the *De Religione Gentilium*.

It still remains to distinguish Truth from the Probable, the Possible, and the False. The probable is of the past—a *narrantis auctoritate pendet*—it may vary from a very low to a very high degree of value. The possible is of the future. The false is of *never*, and applies neither to things nor to intellect, but to appearance only and conception.

With the probable is connected Revelation, which is a matter not of knowledge, but of faith; which, however, may be *false*, and depends for its weight on certain conditions which are of knowledge. Depending, as it does, on the authority of the revealer, it must be good, and compatible with the ordinary dictates of natural religion. If revelation be present, it must be certain to you *ut afflatum Divini numinis sentias*; and beware of atrabiliousness, superstition, and ignorance of causes. If it be past it must be probable; but it is a matter of belief not of certitude, because not verifiable.

It is worthy of remark that the *De Veritate* contains practically all the positive doctrine of the *De Religione*; that he gets at what he holds to be religious truth from the side of speculation, and does not get at his speculation from the side of religious preconceptions. The *De Veritate* comes first, and it has, apart from its real metaphysical value, the merit of being a philosophic book written with a purely philosophic aim.

The conception of relativity of knowledge and grades of truth, the idea of harmonic correspondence between faculties and objects, the notion of the infinitude as of objects so of faculties, the doctrine of common notions implied in and therefore not derived from experience, *i.e.*, Plato's Anamnêsis undergoing transfiguration into a doctrine of categories—all these are valuable pieces of philosophising. If to these we add the conception of method based on the compound predicaments, and some clever points in what we may, for lack of a better term, call psychology—a doctrine of primary and secondary qualities hinted at in the distinction among truths of appearance, *viz.*, that *quod pulcrum in specie* affects us just as *ipsum pulcrum*, while it is different with *species caloris*, or, again, the assertion of the reducibility of external sense to touch, and the remark, *sua tamen veritas apparentiæ falsæ inest*,—we shall scarcely fail to form a very high opinion of the worth of the treatise.

Herbert probably cannot claim to be very original. He borrowed from the scholastic writers in general; from Patricius probably in particular for the *De Veritate*, and from Patricius and the elder Voss for the *De Religione Gentilium*. But, as it stands, the *De Veritate*, having the enormous advantage of being written when men still knew some logic, and yet belonging, like the author himself, to the age of Hobbes and Descartes, and not after all to that of Paracelsus, is good philosophy.

De Religione Gentilium is a much better known book. Its matter is more familiar to us, though it is merely an application of the doctrine of Truth of Intellect with its common notions to the practical principles of religion.

It is the precursor of English Deism, and is abler than most of the works that succeeded it. It is, however, like the *De Veritate*, half mediæval, if half modern, and with its antique derivations, *ex tetragrammato* or otherwise (of Cerberus as the flesh-eater, of Bacchus from Jahve), and other old-world scholarship, it has been too heavily weighted to survive in any real sense of the word.

Herbert raises the question, How is it possible to reconcile divine providence with the damnation of the Gentiles? and gives a double answer.

(I) The Gentiles are not eternally punished. The chief means for knowing God are universal and were open to them, if to us. These means are the promptings of natural instinct, *i.e.*, the *notitiæ communes* about religion, and he sums them up in Five Articles:—

(I) There is one Supreme God, *Optimus Maximus*, (II) and he is to be worshipped, (III) Virtue and piety belong to his cult, (IV) Sorrow for sin, therefore, and conversion (*resipiscentia*) are part of man's duty, (V) and there will be rewards and punishments for man here and hereafter. This is natural religion.

The Gentiles, looking around them, saw for the most part only the perishable. But they saw, too, the planets and other celestial bodies, and the vault of heaven, and these they honoured, not as *summum numen*, but servants and messengers thereof, and Phœnician commerce extended star-worship.

Nature-worship was completed by the additional adoration of the elements. And nature-worship, degenerating from its symbolic character, produced imposture. Prophets and priests arose, to whom, in an ecstasy or a dream, a star or an angel had spoken. These priests dictated rites and ceremonies, gaining profit thereby and political credit, so that the Cæsars are augurs, and pontiffs, and gods, and Cicero himself is an augur.

God's infinite attributes lead to his being celebrated under names innumerable, *e.g.*, among the Jews as Elohim, Jahve, Sabaoth, Adonai,

Schaddai. So Priapus and Bacchus and Mithras are all the sun
 μυστικῶς.

We find further the deification of heroes, God-men, saints, Joshua, Samson, Hercules, Aristotle, Amadis of Gaul. The Christian Constantine has his apotheosis like any other Cæsar; how was theirs less symbolical than his?

With this expansion, however, of elemental worship to hero-worship, we have the adulteries and thefts and battles of the gods—half-symbolical, in part introduced, he thinks, in disparagement of cults, alien and exotic (*ut alienigenarum vel exoticorum Deorum vitam deridendam propinarent*), in part to prove the power of the gods—this is Hobbes' view, too—but in part also to account for the birth of the divine man, the hero.

And so religion becomes corrupt as its *ὑπονοία* is gradually lost while the priesthood fosters sins, to gain by absolutions and purgations.

From the point of view of philosophy the most important section of the book is Chapter XIII., *De Deo Summo*, where, after saying that philosophers and the vulgar alike have always held that there is one supreme God, he proceeds to discuss the main forms of the philosophic opinion.

It is held (I) that the world and God are co-eternal. This Herbert thinks false, because there would be either no final cause of the world, but only the fortuity of the Epicureans, or a final cause greater than God. He has not conceived of the possibility of a pantheistic view of nature.

(II) That God and the world are *in time* coeval, but God is in dignity and power prior to the world which he evolves—*in plasma digerens*—from chaos. To this Herbert objects that it is to posit cause and effect as simultaneous.

(III) That God first created matter and then formed it. This view he approves, and with this, he points out, agrees the belief of the commonalty in *Optimus Maximus*, though to them the moral attribute comes first.

In explanation of his theory, Herbert proceeds to develop an intricate illustration after the manner of Paley. A man, who finds a complex musical instrument, will, from natural ability alone and apart from tradition or revelation or any external aid, comprehend that it is not fortuitous. He will, as he examines it, and in especial when he hears it played, recognise a mathematical ratio or harmony in the instrument and the music itself; as he might in the notes of a musical score which at first sight appear haphazard. He will even see that the instrument and the musician's skill both belong to one art; that there is one end both to the plan of the mechanician and the skill of the musician—this to exclude polytheism. And the more diverse

the elements in the instrument the more necessary it is to come to one harmoniser at last.

So, if a single element in the universe were removed from its time and place and circumstance, Nature's horror of a vacuum would work instant ruin. There is a greater harmony in the universe than our arithmetical, geometrical, or harmonic proportions. "A higher harmony above the reach of our intelligence, you say? then I will honour sun and moon still!" "Not so. That is to neglect the musician and honour the instrument only. And it is plain to see that there is a *præstantior causa*; else were nature dumb and discordant."

Passing from his view of Nature as the *mechanical* product of God, as *Maximus*, we come to the contemplation of Good as the work of God, as *Optimus*, and definitely raise the problem of the origin of evil.

Touching lightly on ancient Dualism, on Ahriman, and Manichæism, and on the doctrine of Original Sin in Christian theology, Herbert points out that in all alike the good is represented as dominant, *in malis summum gradum non dari*, but even so he cannot recognise a principle of evil. It is contradictory to our conception of God as *Optimus*. He avails himself of the position that there are two forms of evil, *malum culpæ* and *malum pœnæ*. The latter takes such shapes as famine, plague, and war, and depends on hidden but assuredly just judgments of God; when it falls on good men it is God's bounteous gift to them of a better life; when on the evil, it is divine punishment. *Malum culpæ* is due to that inborn *arbitrium* which most distinguishes man from the brutes, the gift of freedom whereby alone we can be good, but, therefore, whereby alone we can be evil, or even leave life itself. Both then work in with the conception of God's goodness, and the devil, too, is to be exonerated, for he is only the public torturer and executioner, carrying out the judgments of God. *Haut ita culpandus*.

God as Best and Greatest was worshipped by the Gentiles as their unknown God. This is the germ of truth in their religion, which is otherwise at once defective and corrupt. The priests calling on men to pity the loneliness of God, invented demons. Polytheism was attractive and was profitable. With the increase of rites and ceremonies and symbols the priests were the more necessary.

Oracles which they alone should devise, auguries and visions which they alone should interpret, sacrifices which they alone should formulate, perform, and consume,—these made up the worst side of paganism, in which the most grave crime was Doubt, while Virtue was the last, instead of the first element in worship.

On its better side paganism was theistic. There was *cultus*

proprius of the highest God only; of his visible emblems only *cultus symbolicus*. And from this theistic belief in Optimus Maximus depends the truth that man should repent and turn to virtue, in confidence of forgiveness or a short chastening from a father, who will be just towards offences committed not *in Dei contumeliam* but *sub boni alicujus apparentis obtentu*. And so we come to Herbert's fifth article, involving a theory of punishment and a doctrine of immortality.

For the former he draws explicitly upon Plato, from the Phædo, the Gorgias, and the Republic, though his statements are inferentially rather than directly from Plato. For instance, there is punishment in the other life, which is not *medicinæ causa* but *exemplum* in the case of incurable sin, when there is no struggle nor penitence to condone or remove guilt.

Herbert was apparently rather confused, as a knight of such over-nicety as to his honour might well be, on this subject. He never used Revenge, he tells us in his Life (p. 39) "as leaving it always to God, who the less I punish mine enemies will inflict so much the more punishment on them!" and then follow more adequate reasons for what he quaintly calls "this Forgiveness of others." At any rate, out of the theory of rewards and punishments in after-life appear his views of immortality.

Immortality is a *notitia communis* shown valid by general consensus. And he has further a psychological argument for it in the fact that instinct is *ipsius mentis emanatio proxima*, and therefore precedent to sense-life. But it is only the fact of immortality that we know. The details of our after-life we know only as the embryo forecasts its life in the world. (Life, p. 22, already referred to.)

The five catholic articles are thus shown *ubique* among the Gentiles. Though pagan symbolism—and paganism was symbolism—gave a handle to error and idolatry among the people, yet it involved the universal elements of religion. Are these enough for salvation?

If, says Herbert, you add the oracles of God, the Gentile layman may object that it must be proved that God gives forth oracles; that the priest knows that this oracle was from God and from no spirit or angel, good or bad; that he was not beside himself (*exsternatus*), nor in delirium, nor half-asleep; that he recorded it faithfully, with seal and signature; and finally, that it is so obviously applicable *ad posteros*, that it necessarily passes into an article of faith.

The *De Religione*, then, is an application of the metaphysic of the *De Veritate* to the articles of religion, which include monotheism and a doctrine of personal immortality, and are, as Herbert holds, *notitiæ communes*, universally held. If to the able advocacy of a

rather bold general thesis, we add his acute analysis of the meaning of evil and his elaborate mechanical theory of the world, we have the substance of the book.

It obviously stands or falls with his general metaphysical theory; and the rationalism of it finds an odd commentary in the receiving of the sign from heaven which justified the publication of the *De Veritate*. (Life, p. 172.)

What is the value of that general metaphysic? It is too psychological; depends too much on the individual *sanus et integer*. And this defect prevents him from securing his innate ideas against the difficulties which later Carterianism equally failed to meet. The *notitiæ communes* are ideas innate in the individual, though by accident they are alike in average men; and they are actual, and therefore not merely formal constituents of thought. Without the strong points of Descartes, Herbert shares with him the weaknesses of Cartesianism; and yet was very near to emerging on far safer ground.

Herbert is, perhaps, not so great as Bacon, or Hobbes, or Descartes, or, possibly, Gassendi. His aims in his speculation, at least, are too little obvious. A philosopher should know what he means to prove.

How would he test the truth of appearance or conception? By an appeal to common notions. How establish common notions? By a logic or *zetetica*. From what principles does this method itself start? From common notions. Right, if these be postulates for thought in general. If they be an individual's innate ideas, wrong. And are they not these latter?

To have sought, however, in the spirit of truth is a great thing, and this we can assuredly claim for Herbert. A minor philosopher, as he is a minor poet, he nevertheless possesses, as in poetry so in philosophy, the spirit which alone can attain great things, and this to the fullest extent.